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The Lagging Law of The Continental Shelf:
Some Problems and Proposals

Introduction
Rapid advancement of marine technology coupled with the traditionally
slow pace of legal development has produced an uncomfortable gap between the law which governs the continental shelf and efforts to discover
and utilize its resources.' In response to the enthusiastic challenge of recent marine technology, a new body of law has evolved in an unusually short
period of time. Some of it has already proven inadequate; much is yet untested. The uncertainty which presently clouds the legal maritime regime
has dangerous overtones. It also offers a unique opportunity for the international community to comprehensively devise a legal system under which
every sovereign state can peacefully partake in the wealth of resource which
is the continental shelf. Technology, however, is impatient. If major conflict is to be avoided, international law must be developed rapidly and prospectively. It must not only deal with problems which are already present,
but with some which have not yet been identified.
Generally the questions which must be answered concern what rights are
exercisable by coastal states on their continental shelves, and what rights,
if any, are left to the other nations of the world which have no coastal continental shelves. It is interesting to speculate whether viable laws can be
designed in the face of a largely unknown and perhaps unforeseeable technological future, and which can, presently, provide adequate protection to
diverse interests in trade, travel, and defense on national and international
levels. Past indications of our ability to meet the challenge of deep sea
2
legislation are not encouraging.
In May of 1970, President Nixon made the first official U.S. response to
the problem of the continental shelf by outlining a proposed U.S. Oceans
Policy. 3 Nixon's statement originated within the State Department, then
1. Dreu, Continental Shelf Law: Outdistanced by Science and Technology, 31
LA. L. REV. 108, (1970).

2. It will be shown in subsequent sections of this paper how repeated attempts to
clarify the law of the continental shelf have resulted in perpetuating prior uncertainties.
3. Statement by President Nixon, May 23, 1970; 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 737 (1970).
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under the direction of Elliot Richardson. 4 It was the end product of extensive intergovernmental activity, and represented the skeleton of what was
later to become the United States' draft treaty for presentation at the United
Nation's Conference on the Law of the Seabed in Geneva in 1973. 5 Some
of the specific issues raised in the Draft Convention are a major topic of
discussion later in this paper. In order to gain a proper perspective of the
pending problem of continental shelf law and technological advancement,
however, it is advantageous to trace that law generally from its beginnings.
Background
Surface Waters
Until relatively recently in the history of nations, a state's interest in the
oceans has been confined to the ocean surface and super-adjacent waters.
These are the realms which involve traditional ocean activities. The relevance of the concept of total ocean space-of water surface, water column,
seabed, and subsoil-is only a recent product of technological advance.
Man's earliest efforts to "legislate" internationally with respect to the
oceans came in 1609 when Hugo Grotius first championed the cause of
the freedom of the high seas. By the end of the seventeenth century the
concept of freedom of the high seas was accepted as a general legal principal. 6 The need for some surface line demarcation soon manifested itself
however, as it became clear that no coastal state could reasonably recognize
the existence of international territorial rights on its very shores. As a consequence, the doctrine that territorial rights extended over as much of the
sea as could be defended from the shore was established. 7 Today territorial
claims vary considerably with respect to distance from shore. 8
Traditionally, ocean surface space has been divided into four areas ranging from the closest and most easily controlled by the individual coastal
state to the furthest and least controllable. Starting landward, those areas
4. Knight, Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area,

8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459, 486 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Knight].
5. Id. at 486; the Richardson proposal was officially adopted by the White House
in May of 1970, and President Nixon delivered his address on May 23, 1970. At that
time, a special appointed inter-agency committee was in the process of refining the
policy into a detailed legislative convention proposal. The proposal was introduced in
August of 1970 at a U.N. Geneva Conference on the seabed. It was tabled and will
be considered at the next scheduled convention in 1973.
6. Griffin, Emerging Law of Ocean Space, 1 INT'L LAwYER 548, 549 (1966).
7. State v. Ruvido, 15 A.2d 293, 295 (Me. 1940); see also 48 C.J.S. INT'L LAw. § 7
n.11 (1947).
8. Knight 473 n.57. It is interesting to note, however, that the original, and perhaps
still most widely recognized limitation of three miles was based in 1703 on the then
range of a cannon shot. 15 A.2d at 295.
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are: 1. internal water, 2. territorial sea, 3. contiguous zone, and 4. high
seas. 9 It has been much easier to categorize the rights to be exercised in
the four areas than it has been to define them geographically or legally.
Only one thing is certain: one area is recognized over which the coastal
state has complete and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, and another is recognized over which no state has territorial jurisdiction. Where one area
stops and the other begins is uncertain. The extent to which intermediate
zones exist is unclear. The status of corresponding areas of the seabed
and subsoil is even a greater mystery.
Seabed and Subsoil
Unlike the surface of the sea, the sea bottom is characterized by distinct
topographical features. Moving seaward, the sea bottom is composed of
four areas: the continental shelf, the continental slope, the continental rise,
and the abyssal plain.
Though subject to several inconsistent definitional theories, in its broadest,
non-legal sense, the continental shelf is that area of the under-water seabed
which surrounds the continents and is a gradual, continuing extension of the
dry land mass under the surface of the sea. 10 It is bordered seawardly by
the continental slope, which is the transitional section of seabed between
the relatively shallow shelf and the depth of the ocean floor. In most areas
of the world the continental slope is a very dramatic drop. It has been called
the "greatest topographical feature on the face of the earth."' " From the
base of the slope runs the continental rise. It is a gradual sedimentary
slope, which in some instances (where it exists) provides the final link be9. See The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, U.N. Doe.

A/Conf. 13/L. 52.

10. The term "continental shelf" was first used by President Truman in 1945. In
1953 The International Committee on Nomenclature of the Seafloor suggested that the
shelf be defined as the zone around the continental shelf which extends from the low
water line to a depth at which there is a marked increase of slope to a greater depth.
Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R., 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (Sept. 30, 1945).
Sept. 28, 1945; 10 FED. REG. 12303. See also Knight 464 n.8.
11. The International Oceanographic Commission called the continental slope:
the greatest topographical feature on the face of the earth, an escarpment 3
km. high and over 350,000 km. in length, which in turn is the surface expression of the greatest structural discontinuity on the earth's surface, the
transition from continental to ocean crust.
I.O.C., Opportunities and Problems in Marine Geology and Geophysics, 3 MARINE
GEOLOGY 227, 234 (1965).
Water depth at the edge of the seaward slope ranges from
approximately 1000 meters to 4000 meters, averaging 2500 meters. One can appreciate the declivity of the slope by considering that the average water depth at the
outward edge of the shelf is 130-140 meters, and the average width of the slope is
approximately 32 km. Knight 464, 468.
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tween the continental land mass and the ocean floor. 1 2 The ocean floor it13
self is technically referred to as the abyssal plain.
The status of the seabed and subsoil beyond territorial waters has long
been the subject of considerable disagreement. 14 The issue is complicated
by the fact that the continental shelf is not uniform in width off the various
coastlines of the world. 15 Three theories have been advanced on the status
of the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial water mark. The first is
that the seabed, like the high seas (beyond territorial waters), is the common property of all nations, or "res omnium communis." It is thus unable
to be appropriated by any single state. A second theory is that the seabed
is "res nullius," or the property of no one, but that it can be claimed or
acquired by a sovereign. The third theory distinguishes between seabed and
subsoil, and implements both the "res nullius" and "res omnium communis"
ideas. The seabed itself is "res communis," while the subsoil can, in certain
circumstances, be "res nullius."' 16 Some states have rejected all three theories.
Many found them only interesting topics of debate, until recently, when the
reality of extensive underwater technological exploration was suddenly at
hand.
In 1945 President Truman acted unilaterally on behalf of the United
States in declaring this country's sovereignty over its continental shelf. The
Truman Proclamation represents the beginning of the development of the
modem law of the seabed on both a national and international basis.
Modern Law of ContinentalShelf
The modem law of the Continental Shelf is best understood through a
12. The continental rise actually overlaps both the base of the slope and the beginnings of the true ocean floor. It is technologically significant because it is believed
to contain deposits of hydrocarbons. Statement of Dr. Miller B. Spangler, Center
for Techno-economic Studies, National Planning Association, Hearings before the
Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Committee on Seaward
Boundary of U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 229, 301
(1970).
13. The abyssal plain comprises approximately 2/3 of the ground surface of the
earth. Although it is far from flat, detailed description of its features is not relevant
to present purposes. Knight 471.
14. Address by Ambassador Arvid Pardo, April 26, 1968; 62 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN SoC'Y INT'L L. 216 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pardo].
15. Shelf width ranges from virtually nothing off the western coast of South Amer-

ica to 800 or more miles beneath the Bering Sea. It averages approximately 40 miles
in width world wide. In The United States shelf width varies from one mile off parts
of California to 200 miles off New England. Internationally, states having the greatest
continental shelf areas are: The Soviet Union (1,324,000 sq. miles), Canada
(926,000 sq. miles), The United States (860,600 sq. miles), Australia (827,500 sq.
miles), and Brazil (264,800 sq. miles). These figures are based on a shelf edge at a
200 meter water depth. Knight 465.
16. Pardo 217.
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chronological consideration of its significant stages dating from Truman's
Proclamation of 1945 to the present time. On September 28, 1945, President Truman stated in part:
[h]aving concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently
utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United
States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and the seabed
of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States,
subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another state, or is shared
with an adjacent state, the boundary shall be determined by the
United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles. The character of the waters above the continental
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in
no way thus affected.' 7
Before the Truman Proclamation, very little serious attention had been
paid by this or any other country to the land mass which extends beneath
territorial waters. The land had no recognized utility. Truman's statement
was a result of the simultaneously existing facts that there was in 1945 a
national need for petroleum and that geologists had discovered great quantities of it under the continental shelf. 18 Also, for the first time, the United
States had the technological ability to extract mineral resource from beneath the sea. It is probably because of the early advancement of technology in the United States that much of international continental shelf law
has its basis in United States law and United States activity. The Soviet
Union, until relatively recently, had always taken a very conservative position regarding seabed resource exploitation. In 1950, in the first Soviet
writing on the subject, V.M. Koretskii was critical of underwater claims
made by this and other countries. He wrote that such behavior (laying
claim to shelf lands under the high seas) would lead to a struggle by states
for appropriation of submerged areas and would result in an unjust acquisition by the strongest powers of the riches of the continental shelf areas.' 9
It wasn't until the discovery of extensive gas fields in the shelf areas of the
North Sea in 1959 that Europeans showed real interest in underwater land
claims. 2 0 Conflicting interests in that area eventually led to the Great
17. Proclamation of President Truman, supra note 10.
18. The Truman Proclamation represents a dramatic change of policy from 1918,
when the State Department wrote in response to a United States citizen who claimed to
have discovered oil in the Gulf of Mexico, 40 miles offshore, that the United States had
no jurisdiction over the bottom of the Gulf beyond territorial waters adjacent to the
coast. 1 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw. 2 (1968).
19. 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1969).
20. 1 NATURAL RESOURCE LAW. 1 (1968).
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North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 21 A reasonable conclusion would seem
to be that, generally speaking, a nation's particular interest and viewpoint in
continental shelf areas and continental shelf law is directly proportional to
its own potential economic return from the underwater territories.
Truman's statement was determinative in some aspects, but it left several
important questions unanswered. One of the primary issues which arises is
the exact nature of the property interest which the United States was claiming. No mention of sovereignty, title, or ownership was made. Truman's
remarks included only a statement of intention regarding natural resources
of the seabed and subsoil. Was it to be inferred from the language of the
proclamation that interests and rights other than mineral natural resource
were not claimed by the United States? 22 The question is of much more
significance now, in view of an expanding awareness of underwater utility,
than it could have been in 1945.
On the same day that President Truman made the Continental Shelf
Proclamation, he issued an executive order to the Department of the Interior for regulatory purposes regarding the new minerals just claimed. 23
Neither the proclamation nor the order defined the term continental shelf.
However, an accompanying press release described it as that area adjacent
to the continent covered by no more than 600 feet of water. 24 Since the
point at which the geologic continental shelf typically becomes the continental slope is approximately at a depth of 600 feet, it has been assumed
that the term "continental" shelf used in the proclamation was intended in
its geologic sense. Since in many areas, however, the continental shelf extends well beyond a depth of 600 feet, and the 600 foot figure is used by
scientists as a mere convenience, it appears that the proclamation could cover
areas which in fact lie much deeper than 600 feet, but which are geologically
identifiable as a border of the continental land mass. Argument has been
made that the geologic concept of the shelf can be expanded to include the
continental slope. 25 Though it is doubtful that the proclamation contemplated any claim which far outdistanced the 600 foot mark, modem tech21. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J., 8 INT'L LEo. MAT'L 340 (1969).
22. Stimulation for the Truman Proclamation came from the U.S. Department of
the Interior, and particularly Secretary Ickes who was concerned with the dwindling
domestic oil supply. Secretary Ickes was of the opinion, though his hopes were as yet
unconfirmed, that the continental shelf contained great oil reserves. Borchard, Resources of the Continental Shelf, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1946).
23. Young, Recent Developments with Respect to the Continental Shelf, 42 AM. J.
INT'L L. 849, 851 (1948).
24. Id. at 851.
25. Krueger, Background of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf and Outer Continental Shell Lands Act, 10 NATURAL RESOURCE J. 442, 465-66 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Krueger].
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nology has developed an issue where perhaps none existed in 1945. At the
present time, the proclamation is most widely interpreted as a claim inclusive
26
even of the continental slope.
In 1953 Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which
stated that the jurisdiction asserted by the Truman Proclamation was to
have the weight of statutory law.2 7 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act was a companion measure to the Submerged Lands Act, 28 which ceded
to the individual coastal states the proprietary interests in submerged lands
up to a three mile limit, but it was of much more than domestic significance.
It dealt with the lands outside the territorial belt of three miles-the land
which had always fallen internationally into a "res nullius" or "res omnium
communis" category. The Act addressed itself to two of the questions
which were earlier pointed out as being raised by Truman's Proclamation.
Specifically, first, it did not restrict itself to those lands which lay inside the
continental slope. Section two of the Act defines the term "Outer Continental Shelf" as including:
all submerged lands lying seaward and outside the area of lands
beneath the navigable waters title to which was confirmed unto
the coastal states by the Submerged Land Act

. .

. and of which

the United States and are
the subsoil and seabed appertain to
29
subject to its jurisdiction and control.
One consequence of the Act is that it left the international community
with two definitions of continental shelf. The geologic definition is specific
and limited to one of a series of underwater relief features. The legal definition, on the other hand, appears open ended and seems to include, for
United States' purposes, whatever part of the underwater land which can
be minerally exploited. Herein, however, lies the second issue which was
originally raised by the Truman Proclamation. The Act authorizes leasing
only for the purpose of mineral development. No federal law authorizes
26. Id. at 466. Domestically the Truman Proclamation raised the issue of states
versus federal rights of exploitation in the underwater domain. In U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) it was held by the Supreme Court that the nation and
not the state has paramount rights in the three mile belt of seabed and subsoil under
territorial waters. In 1953, however, Congress responded to the California decision
by effectively reversing it with The Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1301). This
statute ceded to the individual coastal states the United States' proprietary interests in the submerged lands up to a three mile limit. Later in 1953 Congress passed
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1331-43) which attempted to
expand and define the interests involved in the Truman Proclamation and the Submerged Lands Act.
27. S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953); 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (May 22, 1953). See also note 24 supra.
29. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1953).
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either the leasing or use of the outer continental shelf for any non-mineral
purposes. In view of early concern with the production of oil and gas, the
exclusive language is not surprising. As time and technology continue to
unfold, however, the problem of further legislative inaction becomes more
serious. We are at a point where speculation concerning non-mineral uses
of the seabed is seemingly limitless. In conjunction with such speculation,
questions are being raised as to the nature of the property interest which
has been claimed and is exercisable by the United States.
By 1956, most of the world community had acquiesced to the United States
position.3 0 Many states made similar claims on their own continental
shelves. These claims, however, suffered from a conspicuous lack of uniformity. Some states claimed their adjacent shelves to indefinite lengths
and depths; others restricted their claims by either.3 1 Some Central and
South American countries with little or no geologic continental shelf claimed
the seabed based to an exact width of the high seas measured from their
shores.3 2 The status of these diverse claims as evidence of customary international law was the subject of some speculation. The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was held in 1958 in an attempt to gather information and codify new developments. Its success in doing so is questionable. In its efforts to agree upon the definition of the continental shelf,
the Convention merely restated the confusion. In so far as non-mineral
uses of the seabed are concerned, the Convention is restrictive.
Disagreement over precise definition of the shelf was most evident between those who would have the shelf limited by a depth figure (200 meters)
and those who would open the shelf to whatever extent its adjacent state
could effectively exploit its natural resource. The result is an ambiguous
compromise. The shelf is defined as:
[T]he seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast (and islands) but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the superadjacent water admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the said areas.38
30. Krueger 472.
31. Id. at 471.
32. Id.
33. Geneva Convention of 1958, Art. 1, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; T.I.A.S. No. 5578
(1958); U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55. Not surprisingly, considerable controversy
has arisen over the meaning of the last phrase of the definition. One contention is
that it was the intent of the Conference that the definition cover only the geologic
shelf which normally ends at 200 meters, and that the purpose of the exploitability
test was to permit the development of nearby adjacent areas only. Others have argued
that the legislative history supports an interpretation of the clause to include whatever
territory is exploitable, be it shelf, slope, or continental rise. The latter view is favored
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The problem of nondefinition of non-mineral rights in the seabed carries
over from the Outer-Continental Shelf Lands Act to the 1958 Geneva Convention. The Convention does not authorize other uses of the seabed and
subsoil, such as traditional real property, recreational or defense uses. It
limits authorized use to specific mineral-oriented provisions. 3 4 Such an approach is surprisingly shortsighted, even for 1958.
Article three deals with the waters overlaying the continental shell. It
prohibits any interference with their use as high seas, insofar as travel and
fishing rights are concerned. Those waters remain international waters and
subject to the Convention on the High Seas.
The 1958 Geneva Convention was signed by a majority of the 86 states
attending. It became effective in 1964, and as of July of 1970, had been
35
ratified by 39 states, including the United States and Russia.
A problem which has lurked in the background, ever since serious exploitation of the seabed has become a reality, is the nature of the underwater property rights which various coastal states consider to be their own.
It has been pointed out that the Truman Proclamation, the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and the Geneva Convention of 1958 have addressed themselves only to the issue of natural resource rights in the seabed.
As technologists continue to probe into possible uses of the seabed, however,
it is evident that such limited legal guidance will do little to avert future
international discord in reference to other than resource claims. In the
United States, the issue of property rights on the ocean floor was dealt
with, at least peripherally, in the 1969 Federal District Court case, U.S. v.
36
Ray.
Briefly stated, the issue in the Ray case concerned proprietary rights of
the United States in a small group of coral reefs outside of territorial waters
off the eastern coast of Florida. The reefs were clearly on the continental
shelf, and they were totally submerged. Controversy arose when a U.S.
citizen and a domestic corporation attempted to define the reefs as undiscovered islands, and lay claim to them under the theory of "res nullius." The
both nationally and internationally, and does in fact seem a truer reading of the Act.
Particularly indicative of the U.S. position is its own behavior which has carried it
far beyond the 200 meter limit in continental shelf and slope exploitation. The geneal trend of international mining activity supports development of a customary principle of international law, if not a formal one, in favor of the exploitable theory of
national right. This international aggressiveness, however, points out further the need
to define specifically international rights and privileges in the sea. So far our legal
development has most significantly been characterized by a virtually unchecked race
to grab whatever is obtainable. See Kreuger 479.
34. Id. at 477.
35. Id. at 472.
36. U.S. v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
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United States argued that the reefs were part of the continental shelf, and
as such were under U.S. control via the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
and the 1958 Geneva Convention. The court found for the Government,
and in so doing made a number of determinations which are of interest
with respect to the application of national and international laws on the seabed. First, in order to bring the reefs under the scope of the Shelf Act and
7
the Convention, it was necessary to classify them as a natural resource.1
Arguably, the reefs are a natural resource, but a question is raised concerning seabed which is not a natural resource, per se. What are U.S. rights in
that territory in relation to an interested domestic or foreign party with designs other than natural resource exploitation? Or is all of the continental
shelf a natural resource? Secondly, and perhaps in amplification of the
first point, it is significant to note that the Ray court declines to define any
specific property right in the seabed. It states, rather:
[w]hatever proprietary interest exists with respect to these reefs
belongs to the United States under both national (Shelf Act) and
international (Shelf Convention) law. Although this interest may
be limited, it is nevertheless the only interest recognized by law,
and such interest precludes the claims of the defendants and intervenor.S
In 1969, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases came before the International Court of Justice. The cases called into question the status of the
Shelf Convention as customary international law. Based on a boundary
dispute between two parties to the Convention, Denmark and the Netherlands, and a nonparty, Germany, the case determined specifically that the
equidistance formula set out in Article 6 (sec. 1) of the Convention was not
37. Id. at 538.
38. Id. at 542. The Ray case is an important phase of development in the international law of the seabed in that it precludes foreign states from the establishment of
any sort of installation on submerged reefs off the coast of another state. It is interesting to speculate, however, on the hypothetical case of one foreign state seeking to
use the shelf floor off the coast of another state. Clearly, this would not be tolerated,
but on what legal basis? Is the entire shelf itself a natural resource? In The Shelf
Act, natural resource is said to include but not be limited to: oil, gas, and all other
minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other
marine animal and plant life. (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e)
(1953)). The 1958 Convention contains the following statement on the subject:
The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and
nonliving resource of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species, that is to say organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move
except on physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
U.N. Doc. supra note 33, Art. 2(4). It appears that neither definition contemplates the inclusion of the entire seabed and subsoil as a natural resource. A question
also remains regarding what the adjacent state itself can do on its continental shelf
beyond resource exploitation.
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norm creating and therefore not customary international law. Its reasons
for doing so were based primarily on the language of that Article, and
hence, do not carry over to other provisions of the Convention. A more
interesting question concerns the court's view of whether the concept of the
continental shelf had itself become customary international law. The court
contended that, independent of the Shelf Convention:
[t]he rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongative of its land
territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and, as an extension of
it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there
is an inherent right. .... 39

The Court seems to have assumed two things: first, the concept of the
continental shelf has become part of general customary international law.
As such it is binding on all states, regardless of their affiliation or lack
thereof with the Shelf Convention. Second, in the language quoted above,
the careful distinction heretofore drawn between a state's general rights to
its continental shelf, and rights in that shelf's natural resources, is insignificant.
Paragraph nineteen contains the implication that a state's rights in its continental shelf are the same as those it exercises upon its sovereign territory,
i.e., all inclusive.
If it is true that the rights of adjacent states in their coastal shelves are
recognized to an unlimited extent by virtue of customary international law,
and if, as the International Court implies in its opinion, that this recognition
is not and indeed probably cannot be a result of the 1958 Shelf Convention, 40 then this unchecked right must date back to the Truman Proclamation and/or consistent international behavior. Is there not to be any effect given to the limiting language implemented by all states (including the
United States in the Truman Proclamation) in depicting states' rights in the
continental shelf? The customary law which grows out of a declaration of
an accepted practice cannot be broader than the terms of the declaration or
the extent of the activity itself. To the present time, seemingly deliberately,
a state's rights in its adjoining continental shelf have been articulated by
19,
39. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J., 8 INT'L LEo. MAT'L 340,
at 357 (1969).
40. Paragraphs 73 and 74 of the International Court's opinion indicate that the
remainder of the Shelf Convention, outside of Art. 2, has failed to establish itself as
customary international law on three counts:
a. The number of ratifications and accessions (39 in 1969) is insufficient.
b. Time is inadequate; it had been only eleven years since the signing of the
Convention in 1958, and only five years since it came into force in 1964.
c. No international reaction based on a legal sense of obligation is evident.
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those states as being limited to natural resource exploitation. A wider description of those rights is erroneous, and can have no basis in international
or municipal law.
The impact of the Continental Shelf Cases on the development of the
law of the seabed is dubious at best. An unfounded declaration of customary international law has been made which purports to recognize a perhaps, though not clearly, unlimited sovereignty of each state in its adjacent
continental shelf. The Convention, which to date is the clearest expression
of intention by the international community, has been (and probably rightfully) denied the status of norm-creating for nonmember states. No satisfactory definition of the shelf itself has yet been offered. On the positive
side, the Continental Shelf Cases have pointed out the major defects in the
present law of the seabed, and its inability to deal with both present and
future challenges. As more countries become technologically more advanced, the impossibility of equitable resource allocation on the basis of unguarded competition becomes more obvious. The problem of rival claims
between West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands underlines the necessity of a definite vertical or horizontal limitation of the continental shelf
to replace the open-endedness of Article 1 of the Convention. A definition of
rights within that area must be made explicit to overcome the ambiguity of
the Convention and its subsequent interpretation. Lastly, a world perspective needs to be developed regarding resources of the seabed outside a limited area. This must be done to insure that all the states of the world, not
only the technologically advanced and the riparian, may share in the com41
mon heritage of the wealth of the sea.
Issues And Proposals
Toward Geneva in 1973
In August of 1967, before U.S. v. Ray or the Continental Shelf Cases had further exposed the present inadequacies of seabed law, Ambassador Arvid
Pardo, representative of the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations, proposed in a note to Secretary General U Thant the inclusion of an
item in the agenda of the Twenty-second session of the General Assembly
entitled "Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for
Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-bed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the
Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of
' '42
Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind.
41. Friedman, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Critique, 64 AM. J.
L. 229, 240 (1970).
42. Knight 477.
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Ambassador Pardo expressed his concern in an accompanying statement:
In view of rapid progress in the development of new techniques
by technologically advanced countries, it is feared that . . . the

seabed and ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond present national jurisdiction, will become progressively and competitively
subject to national appropriation and use. This is likely to result
in the militarization of the accessible ocean floor through the establishment of fixed military installations and in the exploitation
and depletion of resources of immense potential benefit to the
world, for
the national advantage of technologically developed
43
countries.
The Nixon statement of May, 1970, 44 to which reference has been made,
introduced an, as of then, undeveloped sketch of the proposed United States
Oceans Policy. Between the time of Ambassador Pardo's and Nixon's
statements, extensive work was done in preparing an acceptable international approach to the seabed problem. Subsequent to Nixon's statement,
the United States has developed a draft Convention for consideration by
the United Nations at its next scheduled Convention on the Seabed, in
Geneva, 1973. 45 The Draft Convention was discussed by the United Nation's Seabed Committee in August of 1970, and tabled for future action at
the Geneva meeting.
The remainder of this paper is to be a consideration of the major issues
which were identified as a result of the inadequacies of prior law on the
seabed, and their treatment in the U.S. Draft Convention for the Geneva
Convention on the Seabed in 1973. The Draft Convention is severely restricted by its very nature because it is one nation's solution to an international problem. It is, however, a comprehensive document. The exact role
which it will play in any final treaty agreement is presently unforeseeable.
That it is a significant effort towards final agreement is apparent, however,
and as such it merits special attention. Discussion will be limited to three
issues in particular, each of which, it is felt, is currently not only a primary
source of confusion, but also is basic to any viable solution of the seabed
problem:
1. What boundaries, if any, shall be placed on the continental
shelf as it is referred to in the Shelf Act and the Shelf Convention
of 1958? What are the territorial limits to a coastal state's rights
in its adjacent seabed?
2. Once these boundaries have been established, what is the nature
of the adjacent state's property right? To what extent can it con43. id. at 477-78.
44. Statement, supra note 3.
45. U.N. Doc. A/AC/138.25; 9
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trol the seabed, and are its rights limited to natural resource exploitation?
3. What fights, if any, do noncoastal states have in the seabed?
TerritorialBoundaries
The need for the establishment of definite, geographically discernable
boundaries in the territory under the sea is obvious, and yet it has been
shown how the Truman Proclamation, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, and the Shelf Convention of 1958 dealt with the issue in a totally ambiguous fashion. Such an approach by this country, and the U.N. as a
whole, no doubt was a direct source of the anxiety expressed by Ambassador
Pardo. In actuality, aggressive claims, well beyond any geological shelf
46
area, have been and continue to be made.
The problem was officially recognized well before the appearance of the
1970 Draft Convention Document. In September of 1967, Senator Claiborne Pell introduced to the Senate Resolution 172 on the seabed question.
Paragraph five of the resolution states that:
[F]ixed limits must be set for defining the outer boundaries of
the Continental Shelf of each nation, and such limits can be best
determined by an international conference. .... 47
In February of 1969, in the fourth in a series of resolutions introduced by
Pell, he elaborated on his conviction that boundaries must be set:
. . . [F]or purposes of this treaty the term continental shelf is
used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea to a depth of 550 meters, or to a distance of 50 miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured, whichever results in the greatest area of continental

shelf ....

48

It has been earlier stated that the proposal finally selected by the White
House upon which to build the official U.S. Oceans Policy was drafted in
the State Department. In his May, 1970 statement in which he introduced
that policy, President Nixon said:
I am today proposing that all nations adopt as soon as possible
a treaty under which they would renounce all national claims over
the natural resources of the seabed beyond the point where the
40
high seas reach a depth of 200 meters ....
46.
47.
48.
49.

Krueger 478.
S. RES. No. 172, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
S. REs. No. 92, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. art. 30 (1969).
Statement of President Nixon, supra note 3 at 4.

1972]

Continental Shelf

The Draft Convention, as it was presented to the U.N. Seabed Committee
in August of 1970, contained the language:
ITlhe International Seabed Area shall comprise all areas of the
seabed and subsoil of the high seas seaward of the 200 meter isobath adjacent to the coast of the continents and islands. Each
Contracting Party shall permanently delineate the precise boundary of the International Seabed area off its coast by straight
lines .

50

It is clear that for the first time the issue of territorial limitation of the
continental shelf is not being avoided. It is interesting, however, to note
the basic distinction between Senator Pell's suggestion in his resolution of
1969, and the language of the Draft Convention. Pell provides for underwater territorial claims by coastal states which do not have a geological continental shelf. Presumably, such an approach serves two purposes. It offers offshore protection from foreign exploitation of seabed off every coast.
It also anticipates a time when all nations will have the technological means
to utilize the ocean bottom, be it shelf, slope or abyssal plain. By the terms
of the Draft Convention, on the other hand, it appears that in the case of a
coastal nation having no continental shelf, seabed lying beyond territorial
waters is an international domain. 5'
In apparent recognition of the value of Pell's alternate proposal, the
United States itself proposed, simultaneously with its Draft Seabed Convention, a convention which would, inter alia, fix the boundary between the
territorial sea and the high seas at a maximum of twelve nautical miles
from the coast. Such a resolution, however, even if passed, would have
only an indirect bearing upon the crucial issue of underwater territorial
rights. Clearly, a surface water territorial delineation is not automatically
applicable to the ocean floor below. If the language of the proposed Convention were adopted as it stands, mentioning only a 200 meter depth
limitation on the shelf areas of a coastal state, and the twelve mile territorial
water resolution were also passed independently of the Seabed Convention,
several important questions would remain unanswered. What are the seabed
rights of a coastal state whose shelf drops off beyond the 200 meter depth
at points adjacent to its shores? Do they extend to the twelve mile territorial
limit, and if so, under what authority? If not, is there any justification for
depriving a coastal state of the same use of the territory under its coastal
50. U.N. Doc., supra note 45, Art. 1, 2, 3.
51. The United States has simultaneously proposed an international convention which
would fix the boundary between the territorial sea and the high seas at a maximum
distance of twelve nautical miles from the coast.
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waters that a similar state whose shelf is shallower enjoys? Presuming there
is no such justification, if a coastal state, under the foregoing conditions, be
permitted use of its seabed to a distance of twelve miles from its shores, the
200 meter depth limitation becomes meaningless in any case in which the
shelf drops below that level within the twelve mile mark.
The solution to the whole problem of distance-or-depth territorial limitation is of course in the type of proposal originally brought forward by Senator Pell in 1969. The Convention should be specific in designating an alternate boundary which would be easily and uniformly applicable. The Convention should specify that the International Seabed Area shall comprise
all areas of the seabed and subsoil of the high seas seaward of the 200 meter
isobath adjacent to the coast of continents and islands or seaward of all
points twelve miles from the outer shores of the coastal states, whichever
is further.
Scientifically there is little rationale for a unilateral limitation of seabed
rights at depths greater than 200 meters. In the United States, Humble Oil
has already developed means of extracting petroleum from depths of well
over 200 meters. Designs for exploitation in water depths of as much as
600 meters are presently in the making, 2 Indications are that giant fields
53
of oil and other mineral resource lie untapped in the depths of the sea.
Substantial sums of money are being spent by many of the major petroleum
companies of this country in hopes of sharing the profits of these fields. It
is well known that worldwide annual consumption of crude oil is rising and
that our present sources are limited. Of particular appeal to industrial
nations is the prospect of new energy sources which are relatively near
their projected points of consumption. These facts, in addition to the cost
and environmental risk of oil importation, add credibility to the prediction
that the U.S. and other advanced nations will soon possess economical means
of mineral extraction from deep water sources. When the time comes, a
treaty which places needed adjacent resources in international territory because of a seemingly arbitrary characteristic of depth will not only be unpopular, but difficult to justify.
52. A deep sea drilling project sponsored by the National Science Foundation
has developed the capability for drilling core holes at abyssal depths and has
drilled many such holes in water depths as great as 6,140 meters. Recently
it developed the hole re-entry capability that can be expected to lead to
well control necessary for deep water exploratory drilling. Thus, whereas
an exploratory oil well a few years ago could not be drilled at any cost at
such depths, the technologic capability for doing so is now coming into hand.
Statement of Dr. Vincent E. McKelvey, Senior Research Geologist, U.S. Geological
Survey, Palais des Nations, Geneva, March 25, 1971.
53. Id.
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The Nature of a Coastal State's Property Right
in its Adjacent ContinentalShelf
Whether the Convention ultimately incorporates an alternate, distance-depth
seabed limitation, or imposes only a 200 meter depth limitation as is presently proposed, the situation will, in some instances, arise in which a coastal
state's exclusive shelf territories extend under the high seas. For reasons of
navigation and fishing it is essential that one's use of the seabed does not
interfere unreasonably with international use of the superadjacent waters
and high seas. It has been shown that prior to the Draft Convention, uses
of the seabed, other than resource exploitation, have never been legislated
upon. It is unrealistic to assume, however, that the technology of the future
will not suggest seabed use of a non-mineral-oriented variety. One area in
which there is already a substantial amount of speculation is underwater
transportation. An elaborate system would entail travel routes, stopping
places, instrument stations and, of course, the presence of moving vehicles
themselves.5 4 Such an installation would almost certainly have an effect
upon international use of regions above the seabed. The question is what
light, if any, is shed upon this inevitable conflict of rights by the Draft Convention.
In so far as the full title of the Draft Convention is the "Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area," it is not surprising that
it is of little use in determining property rights of nations in seabeds of a noninternational designation. A tempting conclusion to draw is that a coastal
nation's territorial rights in its continental shelf (legal definition) are sovereign. The theory would be that the shelf is no more than a natural extension of the continental land mass under water, and hence the same exclusion rights of territorial use characterize the shelf that do the land. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Draft Convention provides that no state may
claim or exercise, sovereignty, or sovereign rights over any part of the international seabed area or its resources. Does this imply that a coastal state's
rights in its shelf are in fact sovereign? Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9 emphasize
the autonomy of the waters which cover the seabed in respect to any provisions of the Convention. Does this include waters over a state's shelves
which are not international territory? The Convention document offers no
answers. Senator Pell's resolution of February, 1969, which has absolutely
no direct bearing on the Draft Convention, is more specific. Article 10 of
that resolution says:
All states parties to the Treaty shall have the right for their na54. Johnston, Law, Technology, and the Sea, 55

CAL. L. REV. 449, 454 (1967).
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tionals to engage in fishing, aquaculture, insolution mining, transportation, and telecommunication in the waters of ocean space
beyond the territorial seas of a state. 5
Perhaps if an assumption has to be made as to the nature of property rights
a state exercises in its own shelf territory beyond the limits of territorial water, it should be based on a combined reading of the Senate Resolution and
the Draft Convention. Such an approach would dictate that a state's rights
in the seabed are sovereign, in so far as they do not unreasonably interfere
with the international use of superadjacent waters. While it would be difficult to think of a more equitable principle to state, it is easy to see that such
a conclusion, if indeed the correct one, is far from adequate in view of the
many specific disputes which are bound to arise over conflicting uses of national seabed territory and superadjacent international waters. For instance, what does the foregoing standard tell a coastal nation about how to
construct its underwater railway?
In his statement to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed and The Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction on March 21, 1972, U.S. Representative, John R. Stevenson said:
We believe that it is of critical importance that the regime contemplated

.

. .

provide for peaceful and compulsory settlement of

disputes. We know from experience with resource exploitation on
land that disputes are likely to occur. They should not be allowed to become burdens on political relations between states.
We have proposed a special tribunal to settle disputes under the
treaty regime because it would encourage the development of a
body of expertise in interpreting provisions of the regime. We
have also provided for referral from the tribunal to the International Court of Justice of general questions of international law., 6
The "regime" to which Mr. Stevenson refers is the "intermediate zone"-that area beyond the exclusive control of coastal states but not totally of an
international character. The elaborate machinery proposed by the Draft
Convention is meant to establish an effective means of national and international arbitration and control of the intermediate zone. The zone's jurisdiction could easily be expanded to areas outside of the intermediate zone,
and should, in fact, be widened to include disputes springing from conflicting
uses of national seabeds and the international water territories which are
above them.
55. S. Res., supra note 48, Art. 10.
56. Statement of John R. Stevenson, U.S. Rep. to the Committee on the Peaceful

Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
March 21, 1972.
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Rights of noncoastalstates in the seabed
Probably the major defect of the present law on the continental shelf is that
it assures noncoastal states absolutely no role in the exploitation of the seabed. The inequity of such a situation is readily apparent, and yet absent international legislative control it is unrealistic to expect it to change. Certainly Ambassador Pardo's concern for the undeveloped noncoastal nations
was genuine. Even if the interest of the United States in reaching an equitable agreement is not as meritorious as it could be, it is probably sincere.
President Nixon's assessment of the present predicament seems valid:
• . .At issue is whether the oceans will be used rationally and
equitably and for the benefit of mankind or whether they will become an arena of unrestrained exploitation and conflicting jurisdictional
claims in which even the most advantaged states will be
57
losers.

For whatever reason, the main thrust of the Draft Convention is to establish a just system whereby the territory designated as international seabed-that falling outside the limits of the legally defined continental shelfwill be used to the advantage of all the nations of the world. 58 President
Nixon described the program in two parts. First, he suggested that coastal
nations act as trustees for the international community for those zones of
the continental margins beyond a depth of 200 meters. 59 Each trustee would
consequently receive only a share of the revenues yielded by territories bordering its continental shelf. Second, it was proposed that international authorization and regulation of resource use beyond the continental margins
be undertaken by an internationally agreed upon group to be appointed in
the future.
Details of the trusteeship procedure are contained in Chapter III of the
Draft Convention. Some of its more significant aspects will be the subject
of later discussion.
Chapter IV of the Draft Convention deals with President Nixon's second
proposal, the administrative disposition of exploratory rights beyond the
continental margins. It establishes a five part "International Seabed Re57. Statement of President Nixon, supra note 3, at 1.
58. For a complete description of the general principles which are meant to establish a basis for specific international seabed exploitation regulation, see Declaration
of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof,
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. U.N.G.A.RES. 2749/XXV/ 12/17/1970.
59. The international trusteeship area is that part .. . between the boundary
described in Article 1 (200 meter depth) and a line, beyond the base of the
continental slope . . .where the downward inclination of the seabed declines
to a gradient of (to be determined).
U.N. Convention, supra note 45, Art. 26, 1.
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source Authority" made up of 1. an Assembly, composed of all parties who
are members of the Convention; 2. the Council, the organization's decisionmaking body; 3. Commissions, established specifically to regulate activity
in certain areas; 4. the Tribunal, to decide disputes and answer questions;
and 5. the Secretariat, or the officers appointed by the Council to preside over
the Authority.
Detailed analysis of the various departments and their functions is beyond
the scope of this paper. It is relevant, however, to note briefly the specific
proposals for determining membership in the Council. Since this body is
to be the power center of the Authority, that it be truly representative of the
international community is essential to the success of the Authority.
Article 36 of the Convention describes proposed Council membership.
By its terms there shall be twenty-four members, 18 of which shall be elected
by the entire Assembly. The twenty-four members are categorized in the
following manner:
a. The six most industrially advanced members of the Assembly
shall be automatically appointed.
b. Of the eighteen additional members, at least twelve shall be
developing countries, as elected by the Assembly, and taking into
account equal geographical distribution.
c. Of the twenty-four membership total, at least two shall be
landlocked or shelf-locked.
From a preliminary view, the proposed power distribution seems reasonable and fair. Depending, of course, on future refinements in the decision
making process, and matters not herein discussed, the Draft Convention
machinery for resource exploitation regulation outside of the continental
margin regions appears equitable. Some criticism has been made of the
automatic inclusion of the Authority's six greatest industrial powers in the
Council, on the basis that it is the underdeveloped countries which should
be guaranteed representation rather than the giants.60 For at least three
reasons the criticism is unwarranted. First, Article 36, section 2-b assures
membership to twelve "developing" countries. While a clear definition of
"developing" would certainly be helpful, the provision makes certain that
Council membership is not meant to be dominated in numbers by large industrial interests. Second, the presence of those powers which have
achieved the greatest state of technological advance will make an intelligent
and efficient disposition of underwater resource more likely. Third, the
greatest industrial powers will probably always be politically divergent. It
60. Knight 498.
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is unfortunate, but true that ideological differences provide a great stimulus
in our world to competitive industrial and military development.
While it is certainly true that a combined application of the rules and
principles embodied in Chapters III and IV of the Draft Convention go a
long way toward the development of an equitable and comprehensive program for international underwater resource use, the plan is not without its
faults. Chapter III particularly contains distressing language which, when
put to the test of judicial processes proposed in Chapter IV, could fall significantly short of the professed goal of equal exploitation opportunity in the
intermediate trusteeship area.
Fortunately, the problem with the Trusteeship Zone is not that its boundaries are uncertain. Article 26 makes clear the territorial characteristics
of the area. Serious problems do arise, however, on the issue of operations
control. Article 27, paragraph 1, of the Convention states:
Except as specifically provided for in this Chapter, the coastal
State shall have no greater rights in the International Trusteeship
Area off its coast than any other contracting Party.
As is often the case, the weight of the provision lies in the "except"
clause. In subsequent sections and subsections, the coastal state is given
enough authority over its particular trusteeship zone to render the latter part
of paragraph 1 practically meaningless. Not only is each coastal state given
exclusive authority to issue-or refuse to issue-licenses to foreign states desirous of working in adjacent international areas, but the coastal state is also
given free reign to impose whatever standards it pleases upon those potential
licensees. Furthermore, Subsection C of Article 28 expressly removes any
ban on discrimination by the coastal trustee against potential developers.
Subsection B of the same Article gives the trustee the ultimate authority to
refuse the granting of any licenses at all.
It is not difficult to see that the way is paved for any coastal state to impose impossible requirements, either deliberately or otherwise, upon other
less fortunate nations, and thus effectively preclude them from all opportunity to participate in the extraction of so called "international" underwater resource. There is obvious merit in giving consideration to the inherent interests of coastal states in regulating foreign industrial activity off
their own shores. But the principle can be carried too far. The power to
regulate should be distinguished from the power to control. It is basic to the
purpose of the trusteeship design that those marginal areas beyond a depth
of 200 meters be virtually open for legitimate exploitation by nations not
fortunate enough to have adequate resources off their own coasts. Articles
27 and 28 place the success or failure of that purpose squarely in the hands
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of each trustee whose own legitimate interests may well conflict with it. The
present arrangement actually encourages discrimination against the so-called
"developing" states whose methods would necessarily be less efficient, less
profitable, and yield lower returns to a coastal trustee, the interests of which
would, quite naturally, be in its own profit and protection. At least in this
formative stage, the Convention sadly lacks any assurance that the less fortunate nations will play a meaningful part in the utilization of the seabed.
It might be argued in favor of the Draft Convention that it establishes its
own judicial structure, and that practices which are unjust can be remedied
within the system. To an extent this is certainly true. Subsection 2-d of
Article 44 delegates to the Operations Commission the duty of initiating proceedings for alleged violations of the Convention. 6' This, presumably, entails bringing the matter before the Tribunal. Article 46 of the Convention
authorized the Tribunal to decide upon all questions relating to interpretation and application of the Convention, and requires it also to apply relevant
principles of international law. The Tribunal may, in its discretion, request
the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any question of international law.62 While the process is certainly an equitable one,
its instigation depends on an initial finding of a violation of the terms of the
Convention. Generally speaking, the practices which seem most likely to
threaten fulfillment of the Convention goals are two: political and economic
discrimination on the part of the coastal trustees. Neither is, on its face at
least, necessarily culpable. Yet discrimination of any kind against nations
which, for any reason, are unable to compete on a par with strong and wealthy
nations, will undermine completely one of the primary purposes of the trusteeship arrangement: to provide a system through which all interested nations
may partake in the wealth of the seabed resource. 63
To appreciate the nature of the economic discrimination which is the natural outgrowth of the Convention, one need only consider the financial aspects of the trustee-licensee relationship as it is prescribed in the text of the
Draft. At the outset, a requirement of technical and financial competence
is imposed, not unreasonably, upon any potential licensee. 4 Application for
licensees to explore or exploit in the trusteeship areas must be accompanied
by fees ranging from $500.00 to $15,000.00.65 Additional fees of up to
61. The Operations Committee itself would be composed of five to nine members appointed by the Council from among persons nominated by Contracting Parties.
two Commission members would be nationals of the same state.
62. U.N. Doc., supra note 45, Art. 46.

63. Declaration,supra note 58, at 5.
64. U.N. Doc., supra note 45, at App. B, Art. 2,
65. Id. at App. A art. 3, 3.1; art. 4, 4.1.

2.1.

No

1972]

Continental Shelf

$30,000.00 may accompany the acceptance of an application.6" Once the
licensee has actually begun its exploration and/or exploitation, annual
rental fees become due. These rental fees are regulated within limits by
the Convention, but are tied directly to the volume of production. As a
licensee's productivity increases, so does its annual rent. 67 Should a particular licensee fail to achieve a certain predetermined level of commercial production within a given period of time, its license may expire."
In every case in which a fee is exacted from a licensee by its trustee, a
certain designated percentage of the fee is paid by the trustee to the Authority. More importantly, however, a certain proportion is also retained
by the trustee. The arrangement is, for the trustee particularly, a business
transaction. Its investment value is directly related to the success or failure
of the licensee. It is not unreasonable to arrange for a coastal state to share
in the profits of its adjacent seabed territories. This is especially true when
the coastal state has exercised management duties over the area. Nor are
the fees which have been proposed by the Convention exorbitant. It is unreasonable, however, to expect that the system as a whole will in any way
work to the advantage of the "developing" nations whose competitive capability is, by definition, inferior.
Political discrimination is also based on natural impulse. Clearly, every
nation has its friends and enemies. Short of the extremes of actual alliance,
ideological differences have a great effect upon the extent to which one state
is willing to associate, or be associated with, another. In some instances a
coastal state will be eager to accommodate the desires of another nation to
work in its adjacent coastal areas. The possession of a fertile seabed will
undoubtedly prove a tremendous asset to many nations as a means of developing favorable relationships where such are deemed important. But
many states, and particularly the developing ones, have no influence, or
bargaining power, or special friends. It is they who will be discriminated
against naturally by all trustees. Presumably the larger states whose presence in some areas may be considered undesirable for reasons of national
security will have alternatives. It is the smaller, politically less significant
countries whose interests must be protected.
The problem of discrimination, both political and economic, is a serious
one which effects the prospective effectiveness of the United States proposal
as a whole. It is one, however, which can be remedied with several basic
66. Id. at App. A, Art. 4,
4.4.
67. Id. at App. A, Art. 6,
6 et seq.
68. Id. at App. A, Art. 5, T 5.8-5.9.
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changes in the overall program design. Two major revisions in particular
seem appropriate:
1. The degree of control of each trustee over the selection of
licensees who will be permitted to operate in its territory should
be diminished.
2. Aid in the form of training, materials, and funds should be offered to "developing" countries, on a limited basis, in order to
equip them with competitive capabilities.
The system should be revised so that each trustee is required to consider
all applications submitted to it, from whatever source, provided that such
applications conform to certain pre-determined standards. A requirement
of cause should be imposed upon the trustee for the rejection of any properly
submitted application. In instances where the activity proposed by the applicant appears to pose a threat, or even the possibility of a threat, to some
legitimate interest of the trustee, the trustee should be permitted to reject
it, in writing, with reasons stated, and within a reasonable period of time.
The rejected applicant should be given the opportunity to revise its application or appeal the decision of the trustee if it so desires. Appeals should be
made to the Authority. The Authority, in turn, should consider each case
promptly. Rejections which do not appear ill founded in view of the national interests of the trustee should be sustained. Others should result in
fines or restrictions against the trustee. In no case, however, should a
coastal state be coerced into permitting the actual presence of a foreign state
whose application he refuses to accept. Such a system would, if effectively
administered, have several advantages. It would tend to cut down on pure
political discrimination, and it would make conspicuous those states which
are unable to compete financially for seabed rights simply because of their
own underdevelopment.
To those nations who, through the application process, demonstrate their
need for assistance, special attention should be given. A generous fund
within the Authority should be designated for the exclusive purpose of putting in a realistically competitive position "developing" states which are interested. As previously mentioned, this should be accomplished through
training, the provision of necessary equipment, and percentage subsidy of
funds. Rigorous guidelines should be established to insure that those underdeveloped countries desiring to participate contribute a reasonable amount
of money to the project, as well as show specific progress within a predetermined period of time. All aid should be offered on a strictly temporary
basis, thus placing upon the recipient as much of the burden of accomplishment as is realistic.
Obviously, the administration of both of the foregoing suggested programs
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would present some problems. There is no doubt, however, that the Authority could be set up to accommodate additional functions. Much forethought and some ingenuity would be required to accomplish the desired
goals without becoming hopelessly lost in a multi-levelled bureaucracy. A
plan which is designed to deal comprehensively with an international issue
as extensive as seabed territorial rights must, by its very nature, be exceedingly complex. The United States Draft Convention goes a long way toward
the achievement of a desirable end. It contains some weaknesses, however,
which could result in the final demise of the principle it is meant to servea truly equitable international distribution of rights in the resource which
lies in the territories under the sea.
Conclusion
The problems which are raised by the seabed and technology will never be
satisfactorily disposed of in a single remedial measure. If crisis is to be
avoided, however, comprehensive and prospective international legislation
must be formulated soon. At stake is a tremendous resource, an unusual
opportunity for development, and a whole new phase of international relations.
Present law of the continental shelf is most conspicuously deficient in the
areas of uniformity and foresightedness. Its development has been in response to, rather than anticipation of, technology. If this trend is to be reversed, our methods of response must be reformed and co-ordinated as well.
The Draft Convention, proposed by the U.S. for Geneva in 1973, does not
answer all the questions which have been raised in reference to seabed development. It does, however, provide a procedure for dealing with unresolved issues both now and in the future. To that extent it is enormously
significant.
A system which is as responsive as technology is changing must be devised to protect and distribute the wealth of the sea. It is not important
that the system be the one embodied in the United States Convention. It
is important, however, that the true value of the United States proposal be
recognized.
Paul Sutherland

